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and 
Linda Stephen 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The investment environment in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) is 
constantly changing.  This reflects the effects of several factors including 
major changes in (1) oil and gas prices (and expectations regarding their 
future behaviour), (2) exploration success rates, (3) investment and 
operating costs, (4) costs and availability of finance, and (5) the tax 
system.  In recent years tax reliefs were introduced for investments in 
fields characterised by heavy oil, HP/HT or gas in remote locations.  
Budget 2011 increased the Supplementary Charge (SC) from 20% to 
32%.  The result is that the total tax rate on PRT-paying fields is 
increased from 75% to 81% and on non-PRT paying fields from 50% to 
62%.  Relief for decommissioning is not allowed against the increased 
element of the SC resulting in total relief being at 69% on PRT-paying 
fields and 50% on non-PRT-paying ones.  The notion of a fair fuel 
stabiliser is introduced whereby the surcharge on the SC rate could be 
reduced when the oil price falls below $75.  No details of the schedule of 
tax rate reduction is given and no mention is made of gas prices. 
 
There are several possible effects of the tax increase.  The most obvious 
is to render some new investments non-viable.  These could be new fields 
or incremental projects.  The tax system is essentially a proportional or 
flat-rate one (except in cases where the field allowances apply), and 
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projects which are modestly or marginally profitable under the pre-budget 
system can in principle be rendered non-viable as the result of Budget 
2011.  The investment hurdle issue is discussed in Section 2.  There are 
over 350 undeveloped discoveries in the UKCS covering a very wide 
range of expected returns, varying from highly profitable to quite 
uneconomic.  In these circumstances the potential exists for projects 
being rendered non-viable as a result of a substantial increase in the flat-
rate or proportional tax rate.  Returns to exploration are also reduced as a 
consequence of Budget 2011 and in principle the effort could be reduced. 
 
As a result of the reduction in industry net cash flows the ability of 
investors to finance exploration and development projects is reduced.  
The UKCS is increasingly reliant on medium and small companies to 
undertake exploration and development and they rely much more on 
external finance (both debt and equity) to finance their investments than 
the majors.  Providers of finance will see that the returns to prospective 
investments are reduced by the tax increase and will react accordingly 
with respect to their willingness to provide finance.  Banks are generally 
very cautious in their assessment of proposals for funding projects.  
Currently one leading bank employs an oil price of $52 when assessing 
the returns to a prospective project. 
 
The tax increase applies to tariff income as well as production income.  
Third party tariffing is increasingly common in the UKCS and is 
generally to be encouraged to keep down the total costs of developing 
new fields and projects.  A significant increase in tax could introduce 
upward pressure on tariffs. 
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The tax increase can in principle increase the perceived political risk of 
doing business in the UKCS.  A conventional response to this is to 
increase the threshold return from new investments to reflect this 
increased risk.  It will be recalled that there have been three significant 
tax increases over the last decade. 
 
While these possible effects exist the extent of them can only be 
discovered by empirical investigation.  In this paper extensive economic 
modelling is undertaken to ascertain the size of the effects on new field 
developments and incremental projects.  The modelling was undertaken 
under pre- and post-Budget 2011 terms.  It was assumed for simplicity 
that the exploration effort was not reduced as a result of the tax increase, 
though some negative effect is very likely. 
 
The outputs highlighted are changes in production of oil and gas, field 
investment, operating costs, decommissioning costs, and tax revenues/net 
cash flows over a long term period. 
 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 
The projections of changes in production and expenditures have been 
made through the use of financial simulation modelling, including the use 
of the Monte Carlo technique, informed by a large field database 
validated by the relevant operators.  The field database incorporates key, 
best estimate information on production, and investment, operating and 
decommissioning expenditures.  These refer to nearly 340 sanctioned 
fields, 177 incremental projects relating to these fields, 34 probable 
fields, and 46 possible fields.  These unsanctioned fields are currently 
being examined for development.  An additional database contains 252 
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fields defined as being in the category of technical reserves.  Summary 
data on reserves (oil/gas) and block locations are available for these.  
They are not currently being examined for development by licensees. 
 
Monte Carlo modelling was employed to estimate the possible numbers 
of new discoveries in the period to 2036.  The modelling incorporated 
assumptions based on recent trends relating to exploration effort, success 
rates, sizes, and types (oil, gas, condensate) of discovery.  A moving 
average of the behaviour of these variables over the past 5 years was 
calculated separately for 6 areas of the UKCS (Southern North Sea, 
(SNS), Central North Sea (CNS), Moray Firth (MF), Northern North Sea 
(NNS), West of Scotland (WOS), and Irish Sea (IS)), and the results 
employed for use in the Monte Carlo analysis.  Because of the very 
limited data for WOS and IS over the period judgemental assumptions on 
success rates and average sizes of discoveries were made for the 
modelling. 
 
It is postulated that the exploration effort depends substantially on a 
combination of (a) the expected success rate, (b) the likely size of 
discovery, and (c) oil/gas prices.  In the present study 3 future oil/gas 
price scenarios were employed as follows: 
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Table 1 
Future Oil and Gas Price Scenarios 
 Oil Price (real) 
$/bbl 
Gas Price (real) 
pence/therm 
High 90 70 
Medium 70 50 
Low 50 30 
 
 
The postulated numbers of annual exploration wells drilled for the whole 
of the UKCS are as follows for 2011, 2030, and 2035: 
 
Table 2 
Exploration Wells Drilled 
 2011 2030 2035 
High 38 32 25 
Medium 32 22 20 
Low 25 18 15 
 
The annual numbers are modelled to decline in a broadly linear fashion 
over the period. 
 
It is postulated that higher exploration effort is associated with more 
discoveries but with lower success rates compared to reduced levels of 
effort.  This reflects the view that low levels of effort will be concentrated 
on the lowest risk prospects, and thus higher effort involves the 
acceptance of higher risk.  For the UKCS as a whole 3 success rates were 
postulated as follows with the medium one reflecting the average over the 
past 5 years. 
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Table 3 
Success Rates for UKCS 
Medium effort/Medium success rate          = 27% 
High effort/Low success rate                      = 25% 
Low effort/High success rate                      = 29% 
 
 
It should be noted that success rates have varied considerably across 
sectors of the UKCS. Thus in the CNS and SNS the averages have 
exceeded 30% while in the other sectors they have been well below the 
average for the whole province.  It is assumed that technological progress 
will maintain these success rates over the time period. 
 
The mean sizes of discoveries made in the historic period for each of the 
6 regions were calculated. They are shown in Table 4.  It was then 
assumed that the mean size of discovery would decrease in line with 
recent historic experience.  Such decline rates are quite modest.   
Table 4 
Mean Discovery Size (Mmboe) 
SNS 8.2 
CNS 31.84 
NNS 67.61 
MF 14.94 
WoS 74.7 
IS   7.14 
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For purposes of the Monte Carlo modelling of new discoveries the SD 
was set at 50% of the mean value.  In line with historic experience the 
size distribution of discoveries was taken to be lognormal. 
 
Using the above information the Monte Carlo technique was employed to 
project discoveries in the 6 regions to 2036.  For the whole period the 
total numbers of discoveries for the whole of the UKCS were are follows: 
 
 
Table 5 
Total Number of Discoveries to 2036 
High effort/Low success rate                   216 
Medium Effort/Medium Success Rate     165 
Low effort/High success rate                   161 
 
 
For each region the average development costs (per boe) of fields in the 
probable and possible categories were calculated.  These reflect 
substantial cost inflation over the last few years.  Broadly, investment and 
operating costs doubled in the period 2003 – 2008.  Investment costs per 
boe depend on several factors including not only the absolute costs in 
different operating conditions (such as water depth) but on the size of the 
fields.  Thus in the SNS development costs for new fields were found to 
average nearly $12.05 per boe because of the small size of fields.  In the 
CNS they averaged $17.27/boe and in the NNS they averaged 
$13.65/boe. Operating costs over the lifetime of new fields were also 
calculated.  The averages were found to be $11.47/boe in the SNS, 
$12.36/boe in the CNS and $11.82/boe in the NNS.  Total lifetime field 
costs (including decommissioning but excluding E and A costs) were 
found to average $24.62 per boe in the SNS, $31.95 per boe in the CNS, 
and $26.71 per boe in the NNS. 
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Using these as the mean values the Monte Carlo technique was employed 
to calculate the development costs of new discoveries.  A normal 
distribution with a SD = 20% of the mean value was employed.  For new 
discoveries annual operating costs were modeled as a percentage of 
accumulated development costs.  This percentage varied according to 
field size.  It was taken to increase as the size of the field reduced 
reflecting the presence of economies of scale.  Thus the field lifetime 
costs in small fields could become very high on a per boe basis. 
 
With respect to fields in the category of technical reserves it was 
recognised that many have remained undeveloped for a long time, and so 
the mean development costs in each of the basins was set at $5/boe higher 
than the mean for the new discoveries in that basin.  Thus for the CNS the 
mean development costs are over $22/boe and in NNS over $18/boe.  For 
purposes of Monte Carlo modelling a normal distribution of the 
recoverable reserves for each field with a SD = 50% of the mean was 
assumed.  With respect to development costs the distribution was 
assumed to be normal with a SD = 20% of the mean value. 
 
The annual numbers of new field developments were assumed to be 
constrained by the physical and financial capacity of the industry.  The 
ceilings were assumed to be linked to the oil/gas price scenarios with 
maxima of 20, 17, and 13 respectively under the High, Medium, and Low 
Price Cases.  These constraints do not apply to incremental projects 
which are additional to new field developments. 
  
A noteworthy feature of the 177 current incremental projects in the 
database validated by operators is the expectation that the great majority 
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will be executed over the next 3 or 4 years.  It is virtually certain that in 
the medium and longer-term many further incremental projects will be 
designed.  They are just not yet at the serious planning stage.  Such 
projects can be expected to be linked not only to currently sanctioned 
fields, but also to those presently classified as in the categories of 
probable, possible, technical reserves, and future discoveries. 
 
Accordingly, estimates were made of the potential extra incremental 
projects from all these sources.  Examination of the numbers of such 
projects and their key characteristics (reserves and costs) being examined 
by operators over the past 5 years indicated a decline rate in the volumes.  
On the basis of this, and from a base of the information of the key 
characteristics of the projects in the database, it was felt that, with a 
decline rate reflecting historic experience, further portfolios of 
incremental projects could reasonably be expected.  As noted above such 
future projects would be spread over all categories of host fields.  Their 
sizes and costs reflect recent trends. 
 
With respect to investment decision making and project screening criteria 
oil companies (even medium-sized and smaller ones) currently assess 
their opportunities in the UKCS in comparison to those available in other 
parts of the world. Capital is allocated on this basis with the UKCS 
having to compete for funds against the opportunities in other provinces. 
A problem with the growing maturity of the UKCS is the relatively small 
average field size and the high unit costs. Recent mean discovery sizes 
are shown in Table 4 but, given the lognormal distribution, the most 
likely sizes are below these averages.  It follows that the materiality of 
returns, expressed in terms of net present values (NPVs), is quite low in 
relation to those in prospect in other provinces (such as offshore Angola, 
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for example). Oil companies frequently rank investment projects 
according to the NPV/I ratio. Accordingly, this screening method has 
been adopted in the present study. Specifically, the numerator is the post-
tax NPV at 10% discount rate in real terms and the denominator is pre-tax 
field investment at 10% discount rate in real terms. This differs from the 
textbook version which states that I should be in post-tax terms because 
the expenditures are tax deductible through allowances. Oil companies 
maintain that they allocate capital funds on a pre-tax basis, and this is 
employed here as the purpose is to reflect realistically the decision-
making process. The development project goes ahead when the NPV/I 
ratio as defined above in real terms ≥ 0.3 in the first case and ≥ 0.5 in the 
second case examined.  The 10% real discount rate reflects the weighted 
average cost of capital to the investor.  The modelling has been 
undertaken under the current tax system.  This includes the field 
allowances introduced in 2009 and 2010. 
 
In the light of experience over the past few years some rephasing of the 
timing of the commencement dates of new field developments and 
incremental projects from those projected by operators was undertaken 
related to the probability that the project would go ahead.  Where the 
operator indicated that a new field development had a probability ≥ 80% 
of going ahead the date was left unchanged.  Where the probability ≥ 
60% < 80% the commencement date was slipped by 1 year.  Where the 
probability ≥ 40% < 60% the date was slipped by 2 years.  Where the 
probability was ≥ 20% < 40% the date was slipped by 3 years, and where 
the probability was < 20% it was slipped by 4 years.  If an incremental 
project had a probability of proceeding ≥ 50% the date was retained but 
where it was < 50% it was slipped by 1 year. 
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3. Results 
 
A. Economic Hurdle NPV@10%/I@10%≥ 0.3 
(i) Changes in Number of Fields/Projects Passing Economic 
Hurdle 
 
The changes in the number of fields/projects passing the economic hurdle 
under the 3 oil/gas price scenarios in the period to 2041 are shown in 
Table 6.  There are reductions in all categories of investments.  The 
reductions in the numbers of incremental projects passing the hurdle is 
particularly noticeable, suggesting that the tax increases are not 
compatible with the maximisation of economic recovery. 
Table 6 
No of fields/projects passing hurdle rate 
NPV@10%/I@10% > 0.3 
  2010 Tax system 2011 Tax system  
  $50, 30p $70, 50p $90, 70p $50, 30p $70, 50p $90, 70p 
Probable Fields 9 23 32 7 21 29 
Possible Fields 9 27 38 8 25 37 
Technical 
Reserve Fields 61 167 238 62 159 232 
New 
Exploration 
Finds 58 148 215 50 143 213 
Incremental 
Projects 117 149 162 85 139 155 
Future 
Incremental 202 314 414 187 296 408 
 TOTAL 456 828 1099 399 783 1074 
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(ii) Changes in Oil Production 
 
The changes in oil production emanating from the non-development of 
fields/projects which were viable under the pre-budget terms are shown in 
Chart 1 under the $50, 30 pence price case.  The annual reduction grows 
rapidly to nearly 150,000 b/d over the next few years.  Thereafter it calls 
considerably but will average around 50,000 b/d until the early 2030’s.  
The cumulative loss of production in the period to 2041 is 810 million 
barrels (mm bbls).  This may be compared to a total production of 9,152 
mm bbls under pre-budget terms.  The reduction is thus 8.85%. 
 
Chart 1 
 
 
Over the next decade the reduction in production is principally among 
current and future incremental projects and probable fields.  It is an 
obvious case for concern that a large volume of production from fields in 
the probable category is at risk. 
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In Chart 2 the loss of oil production over the period under the $70, 50 
pence case is shown.  It is in the 20,000-40,000 b/d range over the next 
few years but then increases to over 100,000 b/d in the early 2020’s and 
nearly 140,000 b/d in the late 2020’s.  The cumulative loss of production 
to 2041 is 862 mmbbls which can be related to the total of 13,727 
mmbbls which would have been produced on pre-budget terms.  The loss 
is thus 6.28%.  Over the next few years the loss is from current and future 
incremental projects, but in the later years of the study period the loss 
emanates principally from fields in the category of technical reserves. 
 
Chart 2 
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Chart 3 
 
 
In Chart 3 the loss of oil production under the $90, 70 pence case is 
shown.  The cumulative loss is 597 mmbbls which can be compared to a 
total of 17,065 mmbbls which could have been produced under the pre-
budget terms.  The loss is thus 3.49%.  It is overwhelmingly concentrated 
in the fields in the category of technical reserves. 
 
(iii) Changes in Gas Production 
 
In Chart 4 the changes in gas production over the period are shown under 
the $50, 30 pence case.  The loss increases rapidly from nearly 60 
mmcf/d to 130 mmcf/d in 2015 and remains at over 100,000 mmcf/d until 
2026.  The cumulative loss to 2041 is 764 bcf.  This can be compared to a 
total of 19,844 bcf which would have been produced under the pre-budget 
terms.  The loss is thus 3.85%.  It is noticeable that for much of the period 
the loss is concentrated in incremental projects highlighting the concern 
that maximum economic recovery is endangered. 
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Chart 4 
 
 
Chart 5 
 
 
In Chart 5 the loss of gas production under the $70, 50 pence case is 
shown.  It exceeds 100,000 mmcf/d in the period to 2030.  The total loss 
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in the period is 1,209 bcf which can be compared to a total production of 
33,011 bcf in the period under pre-budget terms.  The loss is thus 6.28%.  
Over the next few years the loss is concentrated in incremental projects 
and probable fields.  This is clearly a cause for concern.  In the period to 
2015 the annual loss sometimes exceeds 150 mmcf/d.  In the longer term 
the loss is spread across all categories of fields.  There is also a small 
increase in production in a few years.  This comes about from the 
combination of the increased rate of tax relief (from 50% to 62%) in 
small fields where the SC is largely sheltered by the field allowance.  The 
result is that post-tax returns are increased! 
 
Chart 6 
 
 
In Chart 6 the loss of gas production under the $90, 70 pence case is 
shown.  The loss soon reaches 100 mmcf/d and in the later part of the 
period grows to nearly 300 mmcf/d.  The cumulative loss is 1,654 bcf 
which can be compared to a total production of 45,974 bcf over the 
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period.  The loss is thus 3.6%.  In the long term much of the loss is in the 
high cost fields in the technical reserves category. 
 
In Chart 7 the loss of total hydrocarbon production (including NGLs) is 
shown under the $50, 30 pence case.  It is seen that the loss increases 
rapidly to 170,000 boe/d in 2015 and remains over 100,000 boe/d until 
2029.  The total loss over the period is 947 mmboe which can be 
compared to a total production of 12,885 mmboe under the pre-budget 
terms.  The loss is thus 7.35%.  Over the next decade much of the loss is 
from probable fields.  In the longer term much of the loss is from fields in 
the category of new discoveries. 
 
(iv) Changes in Total Hydrocarbon Production 
 
Chart 7 
 
 
In Chart 8 the changes in total hydrocarbon production under the $70, 50 
pence case is shown.  The loss rapidly reaches 60,000 boe/d and in the 
-180 
-160 
-140 
-120 
-100 
-80 
-60 
-40 
-20 
0 
20 
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037 2039 2041
mboe/d
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
$50/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Devex @ 10% > 0.3
Incremental Future Incremental Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
19 
 
2020’s exceeds 130,000 boe/d.  At its peak the loss is over 150,000 boe/d.  
The total loss in the period is 1,050 mmboe which can be compared to a 
total production of 19,863 under pre-budget terms.  The loss is thus 5.3%. 
 
Chart 8 
 
 
Chart 9 
 
 
-160 
-140 
-120 
-100 
-80 
-60 
-40 
-20 
0 
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037 2039 2041
mboe/d
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
$70/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Devex @ 10% > 0.3
Incremental Future Incremental Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
-250 
-200 
-150 
-100 
-50 
0 
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037 2039 2041
mboe/d
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
$90/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Devex @ 10% > 0.3
Incremental Future Incremental Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
20 
 
In Chart 9 the change in total hydrocarbon output under the $90, 70 pence 
case is shown.  It is seen that large losses do not occur until 2025.  The 
peak loss is nearly 250,000 boe/d in 2029 and the cumulative loss is 890 
mmboe which can be compared to a total of 25,533 mmboe under the pre-
budget terms.  The loss is thus 3.48%.  The overwhelming share of the 
loss comes from fields in the category of technical reserves. 
 
(v) Changes in Development Expenditures 
 
In Chart 10 the changes in development expenditures over the period are 
shown under the $50, 30 pence case.  The reduction increases rapidly to 
over £1 billion in 2013.  Much of the loss is concentrated in probable 
fields.  In later years the loss of investment is much less.  This reflects the 
small number of projects which are viable under the pre-budget terms.  
The cumulative loss of investment is £9.8 billion (at 2010 prices).  Of this 
£2.5 billion is in fields in the probable category and £3.7 billion in 
incremental projects (current and future). 
Chart 10 
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Chart 11 
 
 
In Chart 11 the reduction in development expenditures under the $70, 50 
pence case is shown.  It quickly reaches £700 million and in later years 
the annual figure sometimes exceeds £800 million.  The cumulative total 
over the period is £15.1 billion (at 2010 prices).  In the longer term the 
reduction is concentrated in fields in the category of technical reserves. 
 
In Chart 12 the reduction in development expenditures under the $90, 70 
pence case is shown.  The largest reduction occurs in the period 2023 – 
2025 when the annual reduction is nearly £2.5 billion.  The total 
reduction is £13.1 billion (at 2010 prices). 
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Chart 12 
 
 
(vi) Changes in Operating Expenditures 
 
In Chart 13 the annual reductions in operating expenditures under the 
$50, 30 pence case are shown.  They rise to £370 million in 2017 with 
large reductions being attributed to probable fields.  In the longer term the 
greater part of the reduction occurs with fields in the category of new 
discoveries.  The total reduction is £6.4 billion over the period. 
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Chart 13 
 
 
Chart 14 
 
 
In Chart 14 the reductions in operating expenditures under the $70, 50 
pence scenario are shown.  They exceed £100 million per year in the 
short term but then exceed £300 million by 2020.  The largest annual 
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reduction is over £500 million in 2030.  The cumulative reduction is £9.5 
billion. 
 
Chart 15 
 
 
In Chart 15 the reductions in operating expenditures under the $90, 70 
pence case are shown.  Annually they are in the range £50 - £75 million 
until the early 2020’s when they increase dramatically to reach a peak of 
£650 million.  The cumulative total is £10.3 billion. 
 
(vii) Changes in Total Field Expenditures 
 
The changes in decommissioning expenditures were found to be 
relatively modest in relation to investment and operating costs.  Often a 
change in timing took place.  The changes in total field expenditures 
(excluding E and A costs) affect employment in the industry.  They are 
shown under the $50, 30 pence case in Chart 16. 
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Chart 16 
 
 
The size of the decrease increases rapidly to over £1.2 billion in 2013 and 
for many years thereafter the annual decrease exceeds £600 million.  The 
total decrease over the whole period is £16.9 billion (at 2010 prices).  In 
the early years there is a major reduction in expenditure in probable 
fields, while in the longer run much of the lost expenditure is on fields in 
the category of new discoveries.  (It should be noted that under this price 
very few fields in the category of technical reserves were viable on pre-
budget terms). 
 
In Chart 17 the reductions in total field expenditures under the $70, 50 
pence case are shown.  The reduction soon exceeds £800 million but is 
then under £400 million per year to 2016.  Subsequently it grows 
considerably and often exceeds £1 billion per year.  Over the whole 
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period the reduction is £25.2 billion.  The majority of the lost expenditure 
is in fields in the categories of technical reserves and new discoveries. 
 
Chart 17 
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Chart 18 
 
 
In Chart 18 the reductions in total field expenditures under the $90, 70 
pence case are shown.  The reductions are substantial in every year but in 
the 2020’s they grow enormously to £2.75 billion in the year 2025.  The 
aggregate reduction is £23.5 billion.  The majority of the lost 
expenditures relate to fields in the category of technical reserves. 
 
(viii) Changes in Tax Revenues 
 
In Chart 19 the changes in tax revenues are shown under $50 price case.  
In the next few years there is an increase averaging over £1.0 billion 
annually (at 2010 prices).  Thereafter there are substantial tax losses 
emanating from the reduced investment in new fields in the probable 
category.  In the long term the average annual net increase in revenues is 
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around £400 million per year.  The total increase in tax revenues over the 
whole period is £13.8 billion.  The low figures for much of the later 
period reflect the low level of activity in the UKCS. 
 
Chart 19 
 
 
Chart 20 
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In Chart 20 the increase in tax revenues under the $70 price case is 
shown.  In 2011 this amounts to £2 billion.  The net increase is less in 
subsequent years because some projects are not undertaken.  Over the 
medium term the net increase averages around £1.5 billion per year, but 
in later years it is very much less.  The total increase over the period is 
£35.5 billion. 
 
Chart 21 
 
 
In Chart 21 the increase in total revenues under the $90 price case is 
shown.  In the early years the net increase averages around £2.5 billion.  
In the medium term it grows to over £4 billion in 2024 after which it falls 
substantially.  The total increase over the period is £80.8 billion. 
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B. Economic hurdle NPV@10%/I@10%>0.5 
(i) Changes in numbers of Fields/Projects Passing Hurdle Rate 
In Table 7 the numbers of fields/projects passing the economic hurdle of 
NPV@10%/I@10%>0.5 are shown under pre- and post-budget terms 
under the 3 prices scenarios.  Compared to the hurdle of 
NPV@10%/I@10%>0.3 there are substantially less investments 
undertaken under all prices scenarios and under both pre-budget and post-
budget terms.  Further, the decrease in the numbers of new developments 
resulting from Budget 2011 is greater when the NPV/I hurdle is >0.5 
rather than >0.3.  With the higher hurdle the aggregate number of viable 
new fields and projects falls from 340 to 217 (36%) under the $50 price 
case, from 698 to 636 (9%) under the $70 case, and from 1022 to 943 
(7.7%) under the 490 case. 
 
Table 7 
No of fields/projects passing hurdle rate 
NPV@10%/I@10% > 0.5 
  2010 Tax system 2011 Tax system  
  $50, 30p $70, 50p $90, 70p $50, 30p $70, 50p $90, 70p 
Probable Fields 6 18 28 4 16 23 
Possible Fields 6 20 35 3 16 30 
Technical 
Reserve Fields 45 124 209 43 115 193 
New 
Exploration 
Finds 30 128 211 25 115 196 
Incremental 
Projects 93 132 152 84 116 141 
Future 
Incremental 160 276 387 58 258 360 
 TOTAL 340 698 1022 217 636 943 
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(ii)      Changes in Oil Production 
In Chart 22 changes in oil production are shown under the $50 case.  The 
reduction grows rapidly in the 2020’s.  Incremental projects in both 
categories dominate the reduction.  Over the whole period production is 
reduced by 2,540 million barrels.  This can be compared with the total 
production of 7.7 billion bbls produced under pre-budget terms.  The 
reduction is thus 32.9%. 
 
Chart 22 
 
 
In Chart 23 changes in oil production are shown under the $70 price case.  
The reduction grows over the years to exceed 100,000 b/d in 2015.  By 
2025 the reduction exceeds 250,000 b/d.  In the long term the reduction is 
concentrated in fields in the categories of new discoveries and technical 
reserves.  Over the whole period the total reduction in production is 1,429 
million barrels.  This can be compared with a pre-budget aggregate 
production of 11.8 billion barrels.  The reduction is thus 12.1%. 
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Chart 23 
 
In Chart 24 the reduction in oil production is shown under the $90 case.  
It increases to 70,000 b/d in 2013 and grows to 130,000 b/d in 2021.  By 
2028 the reduction is 230,000 b/d.  Over the whole period the total 
reduction in production is 1,242 million barrels.  This can be compared 
with a total production of 15.8 billion barrels under the pre-budget 
conditions.  The reduction is thus 7.8%. 
Chart 24 
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(iii) Changes in Gas Production 
In Chart 25 the reduction in gas production under the $50, 30 pence case 
is shown.  It increases rapidly to 100 mmcf/d in 2014 and peaks at 150 
mmcf/d in 2016.  Much of the decrease occurs from incremental projects.  
Over the whole period the total reduction in production is 920 bcf.  This 
can be compared with a total production of 18,363 bcf under pre-budget 
terms.  The total reduction is thus 5%. 
 
Chart 25 
 
 
In Chart 26 the reduction in gas production under the $70, 50 pence case 
is shown.  It increases rapidly to exceed 160 mmcf/d in 2013.  The 
reduction over the long term is principally with new discoveries and 
incremental projects.  Over the whole period the aggregate reduction in 
production is 1,233 bcf.  This can be compared with total production of 
29,372 bcf under pre-budget terms.  The reduction is thus 4.2%. 
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Chart 26 
 
In Chart 27 the reduction in gas production are shown under the $90, 70 
pence case.  The reduction increases rapidly to nearly 900 mmcf/d in 
2015.  Over the period the reduction is principally among probable fields.  
Over the whole period the aggregate reduction in production is 5,568 bcf.  
This can be compared with total production of 42,150 bcf under pre-
budget terms.  The reduction is thus 13.2%. 
Chart 27 
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(iv) Changes in Total Hydrocarbon Production 
In Chart 28 the reduction in total hydrocarbon production (including 
NGLs) is shown under the $50, 30 pence case.  The reduction increases to 
250,000 boe/d in 2016 and reaches a peak of 325,000 boe/d in 2024.  The 
reduction is principally among incremental projects and new discoveries.  
Over the whole period the aggregate reduction in total hydrocarbon 
production is 2,728 million boe.  This can be compared with total 
production of 11,156 million boe under pre-budget terms.  The reduction 
is thus 24.4%. 
Chart 28 
 
 
In Chart 29 the reduction in total hydrocarbon production under the $70, 
50 pence case is shown.  It increases to 100,000 boe/d in 2016 and 
reaches a peak of 275,000 boe/d in 2015.  The reduction is principally 
among new fields and technical reserves.  Over the whole period the 
aggregate reduction in production is 1,678 million boe.  This can be 
compared to total production of 17,294 million boe under pre-budget 
terms.  The reduction is thus 9.7%. 
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Chart 29 
 
 
 
Chart 30 
 
 
In Chart 30 the reduction in total hydrocarbon production is shown under 
the $90, 70 pence case.  The reduction grows to 250,000 boe/d in 2017.  
Over the whole period the sources of the reduction are principally 
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probable fields, technical reserves and new discoveries.  Over the whole 
period the aggregate reduction in production is 2,254 million boe.  This 
compares with total production of 23,614 million boe under pre-budget 
terms.  The reduction is thus 9.5%. 
 
(v) Changes in Development Expenditures 
 
Chart 31 
 
 
In Chart 31 the reduction in development expenditures under the $50, 30 
pence case is shown.  The reduction grows rapidly to £1.2 billion in 2012 
and is generally in excess of total amount until 2018.  Over the period the 
reduction is mostly in incremental projects and new discoveries.  Over the 
whole period the aggregate reduction in field investment is £19.2 billion 
(at 2010 prices). 
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£1.4 billion in 2023.  Over the period the reduction is principally among 
probable fields, new discoveries and technical reserves.  Over the whole 
period the aggregate reduction in investment expenditures is £19.5 
billion. 
Chart 32 
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In Chart 33 the reduction in development expenditures under the $90, 70 
pence case is shown.  It increases rapidly to £1.35 billion in 2012 and 
nearly £1.6 billion in 2015.  Over the whole period the aggregate 
reduction in investment expenditures is £29.1 billion (at 2010 prices). 
 
Chart 33 
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(vi) Changes in Operating Expenditures 
In Chart 34 the reduction in field operating expenditures is shown under 
the $50, 30 pence case.  These grow to £500-£600 million per year for 
much of the study period.  The reductions are concentrated in new 
discoveries and incremental projects.  Over the whole period the 
aggregate reduction in field operating expenditures is £16 billion (at 2010 
prices). 
Chart 34 
 
 
In Chart 35 the reduction in field operating expenditures is shown under 
the $70, 50 pence case.  They increase over the years to exceed £600 
million in 2024 and remain above that level for many years.  The 
reduction is most noticeable on new discoveries and technical reserves.  
Over the whole period the aggregate reduction in operating expenditures 
is £12.8 billion (at 2010 prices). 
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Chart 35 
 
In Chart 36 the reduction in field operating expenditures under the $90, 
70 pence case is shown.  The reduction grows steadily over the years to 
reach a maximum of over £1 billion in 2027.  The decrease is principally 
among new discoveries and technical reserves.  Over the whole period the 
aggregate reduction in operating expenditures is £21.1 billion. 
Chart 36 
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(vii) Changes in Total Field Expenditures 
In Chart 37 the reduction in total field expenditures (including 
decommissioning) are shown under the $50, 30 pence case.  These 
increase rapidly to exceed £1.2 billion and attain a peak of £1.5 billion in 
2018.  The reduction is concentrated on incremental projects and new 
discoveries.  Over the whole period aggregate field expenditures are 
reduced by £34.9 billion (at 2010 prices).  Much of the reduction occurs 
in the categories of incremental projects and new discoveries. 
 
Chart 37 
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In Chart 38 the reduction in total field expenditures under the $70, 50 
pence case is shown.  The reduction increases to £1.4 billion in 2014 and 
reaches a peak of £1.8 billion in 2023.  Much of the reduction occurs in 
fields in the categories of technical reserves and new discoveries.  Over 
the whole period the aggregate reduction in field expenditures was £33.2 
billion (at 2010 prices). 
 
Chart 38 
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In Chart 39 the reduction in total field expenditures under the $90, 70 
pence case is shown.  The reduction reaches £1.5 billion in 2012 and 
reaches a peak of £3.2 billion in 2026.  Over the whole period the 
aggregate reduction in field expenditures is £52.2 billion. 
 
Chart 39 
 
 
 
 
(viii) Changes in Tax Revenues 
In Chart 40 the changes in the tax revenues are shown under the $50, 30 
pence case.  While substantial increased net revenues occur over the next 
few years these are followed by large net revenue reductions.  Over the 
whole period the aggregate reduction in tax revenues is £12.7 billion (at 
2010 prices). 
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In Chart 41 the changes in tax revenues are shown under $70, 50 pence 
case.  Over the next few years the increases are in the £1.5-£2 billion 
range.  After that they fall off sharply.  Over the whole period the 
aggregate increase in tax revenue is £23.2 billion (at 2010 prices). 
Chart 41 
 
 
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
20092011201320152017201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041
£m (2010)
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
$50/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Devex @ 10% > 0.5
Sanctioned Incremental Future Incremental
Probable Possible Technical Reserves
New Exploration
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037 2039 2041
£m (2010)
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
$70/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Devex @ 10% > 0.5
Sanctioned Incremental Future Incremental Probable
Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
46 
 
In Chart 42 the changes in tax revenues are shown under the $90, 70 
pence case.  In the near term the increases are in the £2.5 billion-£3 
billion range and for many years they exceed £2 billion per year.  Over 
the whole period the aggregate increase in tax revenues is £51.6 billion 
(at 2010 prices).  These are net increases and conceal major tax 
reductions from probable and possible fields of £4.2 billion. 
 
Chart 42 
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increase on investment in new fields and incremental projects.  As noted 
in Section 1 there are several other effects.  Thus the increased tax rates 
reduce the returns from exploration and some marginally or modestly 
attractive prospects may not be drilled.  There will be a reduced 
exploration effort on this count.  Further, the reduced net cash flows 
reduce the ability of investors to finance exploration which can also result 
in a reduced exploration effort. 
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The UKCS is becoming increasingly dependent on medium and small 
companies not only for exploration but for field developments.  The 
financing problem is increased by the tax increases.  External providers of 
capital (debt and equity) will note the reduction in expected cash flows 
from the tax increase.  Banks generally take a cautious view of the 
financing of projects in the petroleum industry and the net result may be 
greater difficulty in raising external finance for new developments. 
 
The tax increase applies to tariff incomes as well as production incomes.  
One possible consequence is that asset owners may attempt to increase 
tariff rates to compensate for the increase in tax.  In turn this could cause 
further difficulties in concluding tariff agreements. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this study the effects of the tax increases announced in Budget 2011 on 
investment in new fields and incremental projects have been examined in 
detail under a range of oil and gas prices used for screening long term 
projects, and under two investment hurdles.  When the investment hurdle 
was set at NPV@10%/I@10%≥ 0.5 the results under the $50, 30 pence 
price were that over the 30-year period to 2041 there could be a reduction 
of 23 new field developments and substantial incremental projects 
undertaken.  The result would be a cumulative reduction of oil and gas 
production of 920 million boe.  A reduction in field investment of £19.2 
billion (at 2010 prices) would occur.  Total field expenditures would be 
reduced by £34.9 billion.  Tax revenues would be reduced by £12.8 
billion. 
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Under the $70, 50 pence case there would be 62 less new field 
developments and major incremental projects undertaken over the period.  
The resulting loss of production would be 1.7 billion boe.  The reduction 
in field investment would be £19.5 billion and the reduction in total field 
expenditures £33.2 billion.  Tax revenues would increase by £23.3 
billion. 
 
Under the $90, 70 pence case there would be 79 less new field 
developments and major incremental projects undertaken over the period.  
The resulting loss of production would be 2,254 million boe.  The 
reduction in field investment would be £29.1 billion and the reduction in 
total field expenditures £52.2 billion.  Tax revenues would increase by 
£51.6 billion. 
 
There will be further reduction in activity relating to the reduced 
prospective returns on new exploration and the increased financing 
problems for medium and small companies resulting from the tax 
increases. 
 
The analysis indicates that the policy of maximising economic recovery 
from the UKCS has been impeded by the tax increases.  This is 
noteworthy with respect to incremental projects in mature fields subject 
to PRT, but also in many new fields where the investment and operating 
costs are very high.  A noteworthy finding is that even under the $90, 70 
pence price case a substantial number of fields/projects are rendered 
uneconomic by the tax increases. 
 
The root of the problem emanates from the coexistence of a flat-rate (or 
proportional) tax system (except where field allowances apply) with a 
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large number of undeveloped discoveries and incremental projects which 
cover a very wide range of expected profitability.  Some fields/projects 
will offer substantial returns.  Some will be moderately profitable, some 
will be marginally attractive and many will be uneconomic.  The 
consequence of raising the flat tax by a significant amount will be to 
render some fields/projects uneconomic when they were acceptable on 
pre-budget terms.  This study has quantified these effects. 
 
A progressive tax system whereby the (percentage) take increases as the 
returns to investments increase and decrease when the returns are lower 
can more efficiently collect the highly differentiated economic rents 
which personify the situation in the UKCS.  The above suggests that 
allowances relating to the investment costs are needed to facilitate the 
development of fields/projects which are uneconomic under the Budget 
2011 proposals.  For new fields there are already field allowances for the 
SC relating to physical characteristics namely small size, HP/HT, heavy 
oil, and remote, deep water gas fields.  These are really proxies for 
investment costs and a cleaner system would be to have an allowance 
relating to the investment costs.  This would be superior to allowances 
based on physical characteristics because there will inevitably be cases 
where a field is uneconomic for reasons other than those covered by the 
precise physical characteristics embedded in the field allowances. 
 
The study has also highlighted the disincentives to pursue incremental 
projects in PRT-paying fields.  These have become greater as a result of 
Budget 2011.  To remedy this allowances against PRT relating to the 
investment costs of the incremental projects are appropriate. 
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A wider review of the system is necessary if maximum economic 
recovery is to be attained.  This would include further examination of 
appropriate tax rates as well as allowances. 
 
